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Abstract 
A recent publication by the World Bank on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has 
established that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of over two decades of growth resurgence. 
This chapter explores the role of transfer pricing in SSA’s extreme poverty tragedy. The 
analytical structure entails: (i) emphasis of rational asymmetric development as the dark side 
of transfer pricing, (ii) evidence that the recent growth resurgence in African countries has 
been driven substantially by resource-rich countries which are experiencing high levels of 
exclusive growth and extreme poverty, (iii) the practice of  transfer pricing by multinationals 
operating  in resource-rich countries of  SSA and (iv) a Zambian case study of extreme 
poverty and  transfer pricing schemes by Glencore in the copper industry. While transfer 
pricing is contributing to diminishing African growth, available evidence shows that the 
component growth that is not captured by transfer pricing does not trickle down to the poor 
because the African elite is also captured by practices of rational asymmetric development. 
Policy implications for the fight against extreme poverty are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
A recent publication by the World Bank on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has 
established that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 2015). Consistent 
with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015), about 45% of nations in the sub-region are 
substantially off-track from attaining the MDGs extreme poverty target. From the evidence 
provided by Figure 1, it can be noticed that, but for SSA, extreme poverty has been decreasing 
in all other regions of the world. This is an unfortunate tendency, despite about two decades 
of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (Alan & Carlyn, 2015, p. 598). In this light, 
optimistic narratives of African countries: (i)  with the exception of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, reaching the MDGs poverty target one year ahead of time (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-
Martin, 2014) and/or (ii) witnessing considerable poverty decline compared to other world 
regions (Fosu, 2015); may have been motivated by a stream of the literature on ‘Africa rising’ 
and/or ‘the African growth miracle’ (Leautier, 2012; Young, 2012); a current of motivation 
which  could be more concerned about promoting the interest of neoliberal ideology and 
capital accumulation, therefore, not taking into account fundamental ethical concerns like 
ecological crisis, inequality and sustainability in job creation (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). 
Figure 1: Comparative regional poverty levels 
 
Over the past decades, a lot of scholarly attention has focused on the causes of African 
poverty (Englebert, 2002; Jerven, 2011; Kodila-Tedika & Agbor, 2014; Asongu & Kodila-
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Tedika, 2015). The plethora of studies has either been based on the existence of an African 
dummy or the assumption that the continent is fundamentally different from other regions of 
the world. Some of the documented reasons for persisting poverty  include:  social barriers to 
economic growth and technological change (Amavilah, 2015); deinstitutionalization of Africa 
(Nunn, 2008, 2009; Nunn & Puga, 2012)  and/or loss of traditional African institutions  
(Amavilah, 2014a, 2006; Lewis, 1955); inability to make a clear distinction between ‘private 
property rights’ and ‘private use rights’ (Amavilah, 2015); overvaluation of foreign 
knowledge and undervaluation of local knowledge (Brush & Stabinsky, 1996; Raseroka, 
2008; Lwoga et al., 2010; Asongu, 2014a; Tchamyou, 2014; Amavilah et al., 2014; Asongu et 
al., 2014); over-idleness of natural resources (Doftman, 1939; Lewis, 1955; Amavilah, 
2014a);  ‘Ignoring art as an expression of technological knowledge’ (Amavilah, 2014a); 
excessive consumption of luxury (Adewole & Osabuohien, 2007; Efobi et al., 2013); lack of 
capacity to acknowledge scarcity (Lewis, 1955; Dorfman, 1939; Lucas, 1993; America, 2013; 
Drine, 2013; Looney, 2013; Asongu, 2014ab); negative influences from colonialism and 
noecolonialsm (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013); false economics of preconditions (Monga, 2014) 
which have resulted in lost decades of policy prescriptions from the Washington Consensus 
(Lin, 2015); less self-reliance (Fofack, 2014) or over-dependence on development assistance 
(Moyo, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Asongu, 2014c); absence of qualitative measurements in  
African paradigms of development (Obeng-Odoom, 2013); inability to effectively negotiate 
for foreign aid, absence of favourable local conditions and presence of fragile institutions 
(Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001); low levels of regional integration (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, et al., 2014) 
and, inter alia, corruption in international trade (Musila & Sigué, 2010) and asymmetric 
globalisation-fuelled policies that are more favourable to developed countries (Asongu, 
2015a).  
To the best of our knowledge, the role of ‘transfer pricing’ (hence TP) has not been 
substantially explored as a fundamental cause of African poverty. According to Sikka and 
Willmott (2010, p. 342), in the conventional literature on accounting, TP is a technique that is 
employed by multinationals to optimally allocate revenues and costs across joint ventures, 
subsidiaries and among divisions within a group of entities that are related. Consistent with 
the authors, these representations of TP illustrate how multinational companies are 
substantially involved in processes of wealth retentiveness which enable corporations to avoid 
taxes and ease capital flight. In essence, while a conception of purely technical nature of 
computing TP could abstract from the politico-economic contexts of their development and 
5 
 
usage, the context much reflects contemporary business activities or an époque of globalised 
trade combined with interactions among tax authorities of the state, shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the business practicing TP. It is acknowledged that the practices determine 
economic opportunities in ways that are critical in augmenting private gains, hence, 
contributing to social impoverishment of developing countries through tax avoidance.  
In light of the above, to logically establish that  TP may be a source of extreme 
poverty in SSA countries, at least four conditions are necessary: (i) evidence of rational 
asymmetric development as the dark-side of TP; (ii) establishing that the recent growth 
resurgence in African countries has been driven substantially by resource-rich countries which  
are experiencing high levels of exclusive growth and extreme poverty, (iii) substantiating that 
TP is practiced by foreign multinational in resource-rich countries in SSA and (iv) a case 
study of a resource-rich countries from which we clearly articulate the first-three points.  In 
what follows, one section is devoted to elucidating each of the four points, while the last 
section concludes.  
 
2. Rational asymmetric development and the dark side of transfer pricing   
 In this section, we:  (i) clarify the concept of rational asymmetric development; (ii) 
elucidate the correlation between rational asymmetric development and TP and (iii) engage 
the dark side of TP.  
Consistent with Asongu (2015a), rational asymmetric development “refers to unfair 
practices of globalisation adopted by advanced nations to the detriment and impoverishment 
of less developed countries” (p. 14). The author refers the interested reader to find more 
insights into the phenomenon in studies focused on capitalism-oriented rational asymmetry. 
Some examples include: ‘Making Globalisation Work’  by Stiglitz (2007) which documents 
that “The average European cow gets a subsidy of $2 a day; more than half of the people in 
the developing world live on less than that.  It appears that it is better to be a cow in Europe 
than to be a poor person in a developing country” (p. 85).  Additionally, “Without subsidies, 
it would not pay for the Unites States to produce cotton; with them, the United States is, as we 
have noted, the world's largest cotton exporter" (p.85).  Moreover, the Chang (2008) ‘Bad 
Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism’ also provides 
insights into the underlying concept. Mshomba (2011) has also provided an African specific-
perspective with a systematic review of how the World Trade Organisation (WTO) policies 
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are affecting Africa while Asongu (2015a) has extended the celebrated Piketty (2014) 
literature to elucidate the spirit of African poverty.  
Drawing from the above, in the second strand there are grounds on which to sustain 
that capitalism-fuelled TP is fundamentally motivated by rational corporate policies from 
multinational companies which are primarily concerned about increasing shareholder value, 
with little regard over how such practices (like tax evasion by multinationals) affect the 
livelihoods of the poor in the less developed world from which they operate. According to 
Osabuohien et al. (2013, 2014, 2015), multinational corporations in African countries have 
been increasingly employing very questionable accounting practises that enable them to 
declare minimum profits and therefore liable to low taxes to African governments. The 
dichotomy between less developed and more advanced countries comes-in when such rational 
corporate practices are destined to increase tax revenues in more advanced countries to the 
detriment of their less developed counterparts. In this light, owing to accounting malpractices, 
a substantial chunk of wealth from African countries end-up in offshore financial centres that 
are for the most part under the jurisdictions of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) nations (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003, 2010; Fofack & Ndikumana, 
2010). Given that, these off-shore financial centres are economically and politically managed 
by OECD countries, it follows that advanced nations are the primary beneficiaries of these 
rational corporate practices. Hence, the term: ‘rational asymmetric development’.  
The European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD, 2008) has provided 
an interesting literature on how the ‘black hole’ of asymmetric development can be tackled 
through capital flight regulation. It is important to note that more than 50% of illicit capital 
flight from developing countries involves questionable accounting practices by corporations 
(EURODAD, 2008, p. 7). Some characteristics of capitalism-driven illicit capital flight 
practices documented in the study include: speculation and volatility, tax havens, tax 
concessions, investment and abusive TP, emergence of hedge funds and private equity, capital 
account liberalisation and its implications, failure by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to enhance financial surveillance and regulation and, European nations easing conditions for 
regulatory inefficiencies in hedge funds and private equity as well as facilitating capital flight 
from less developed countries. From the above narrative, asymmetric development between 
rich and poor countries is fundamentally driven by capitalism-oriented policies, with a 
significant determinant of illicit capital flight flowing from less developed to advanced 
nations being the practice of TP. 
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Borrowing from Sikka and Willmott  (2010), we engage the dark side of TP in the 
third strand. According to the authors, TP is of growing relevance to companies in the 
globalised world where their operations are not limited to a single country, but extended to 
nations with differing regulation capacities and regimes of taxation. The narrative sustains 
that, in the pursuit of cash flows, marketing goals, joint ventures, profits, inter alia, 
corporations are obliged to recourse to rational measures of taxable profits and cost 
performance. Under such environmental conditions, multinational corporations develop 
processes of overhead- and cost-allocation as well as design strategies with which to transfer 
commodities. Given the subjective nature of overhead and cost allocation channels, 
companies enjoy some discretion in tailoring them towards specific geographical jurisdictions 
and commodities. Such discretion allows them to keep taxes at minimum, hence, increasing 
profits. The strategy consists of allocating most profits to low-risk and low-tax jurisdictions. 
While there is some consensus that TP can help companies mitigate the negative effects of 
double taxation, the practice is substantially abused as it is: (i) used to shift profits by virtually 
every multinational company in the world (Baker, 2005) and (ii) increasingly being employed 
to artificially shift profits to low- from high-tax jurisdictions, thereby maximizing income in 
the former and expenses in the latter. Ultimately, TP remains the most important issue of 
international tax Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are increasingly being confronted with 
(Ernst & Young, 2006), essentially because it is very instrumental in tax avoidance (Ernst & 
Young, 2005) which has consequences in the distribution of public commodities and wealth 
in low-income countries. 
Globalization has brought about new dimensions in the politics of TP (Sikka and 
Willmott, 2010). Extricated from the constraints of territorial jurisdictions, MNEs find it 
easier to establish joint ventures, trust, special purpose entities, affiliates and subsidiaries that 
enable them to take advantage of favorable subsidies and taxes in certain geographic 
locations. Hence, global production has bought new and extensive avenues for TP schemes 
that enable MNEs to avoid taxes in less desirable locations and shift profits to more desirable 
areas. The sheer complexity, power and scale of globalization represents a significant 
challenge to mainstream thinking on TP, essentially because owing to complex production 
and exchange networks: (i) domestic corporations  now have transnational and multinational 
tendencies and (ii) foreign corporations either work with local companies through joint 
ventures or establish fresh businesses in new jurisdictions.  
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The overwhelming increases in corporate power and global trade has provided many 
avenues for crafting ‘tax avoidance’ TP strategies, especially with the tendency of MNEs 
exploiting natural resources in less developed countries. Hence, developing nations are 
substantially vulnerable to TP practices of illicit capital flight and/or tax avoidance 
(Borkowski, 1997). The evidence of manipulation by MNEs in developing countries has been 
documented in a broad stream of literature, including: (i) the IMF’s position that the 
globalization of trade has emerged in tandem with numerous issues for national tax 
authorities, accruing from the abuse and potential use of TP by MNEs, entailing, the 
allocation of fixed costs, loans, patents and trademark valuations (Sikka & Willmott, 2010); 
(ii)  a plethora of tax administrators are involved in TP practices (Tanzi, 2000).  
The strength of MNEs is consolidated with the ideologies of capitalism, as nation-
states are obliged to compete in order to attract the investment needed to boost domestic 
economies. This competition engenders avenues by which MNEs devise TP strategies, 
rationally needed to take advantage of differences in taxes across nation-states (Sikka & 
Willmott, 2010). In addition, the opportunities provided by TP are beginning to facilitate the 
birth of microstates, which are known as ‘tax havens’ or offshore financial centers. These 
microstates are instrumented by advanced nations with legislative powers to provide less tight 
regulation, preserve secrecy and impose no/low taxes which are attractive to MNEs seeking 
blur administrative structures. The secrecy represents a fertile ground for creative TP schemes 
that are being exploited for tax avoidance. No wonder approximately half of global trade 
transactions transit via offshore financial centers, despite these jurisdictions accounting only 
for about 3% of World GDP. While microstates represent only 1.2% of the global population, 
they account for 26% (31%) of assets (net profits from American MNEs).  
We end this section by providing some stylized facts on the increasing power of 
microstates and growing influence of MNEs vis-à-vis nation states. First, consistent with 
Sikka and  Willmott (2010), every year about 200 000 new corporations are created in 
microstates, with a cumulative number of about 3000 000 after the turn of the millennium  
according to Baker (2005). Consistent with the narrative, some cases in point include: (i) a 
building in Caymans registering about 18, 857 corporations, including major global MNEs 
(US Government Accountability Office, 2008); (ii) the British Virgin Islands (Caymans) 
having 3389 (182) corporations by per 100 people and (iii) the 575 residents of Sark Island 
(part of the Channel Islands) having some 15,000 companies which are non-resident 
corporations for the most part (UK Home Office, 1998). A common denominator among these 
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tax havens is that they do not impose taxes on the profits of corporations and hence, local tax 
authorities are not concerned about TP practices. Second, at the start of the third millennium, 
of the 100 largest economies, 51% were not nation states but MNEs with a considerable 
exercise of power (Anderson et al., 2005). According to the narrative: (i) the 100 biggest 
companies controlled about $3400 billion worth of assets, of which about 40% are not located 
within domestic economies; (ii) the top 200 companies represented about 28% of the world 
economy; (iii) the top 500 controlled 70% of global trade,80% of FDI, 30% of world GDP, 
about 33.3% of manufactured exports, 75% of trade in goods and services and approximately 
80% of trade in technical and management services; (iv) less developed countries which are 
dependent on agriculture are left to the whims and caprices of MNEs because, only 20 
controlled the trade of coffee, 6 influenced 70% of trade in wheat, 1 controlled about 98% of 
packed tea production and 2 companies influenced about 80% of world grain which was 
distributed by two MNEs and (v) intellectual property rights (IPRs) were essentially 
monopolized at about 97% by OECD nations, of  which 90% were held by powerful MNEs 
(Anderson et al., 2005).  
 
3. Africa rising, resource-rich SSA countries, exclusive growth and poverty  
 In this section, drawing from the evidence that most of Africa’s growth has been 
driven by resource-wealth countries with oil, mining and gas industries (Deaton, 1999; 
Veselinovic, 2015), we present evidence that underlying countries are characterised with 
exclusive growth and poverty. We have shown above that the growth resurgence in the sub-
region has been fundamentally driven by resource-rich nations owing to increasing 
commodity prices (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012ab; Asongu, 2014d). Unfortunately, these 
wealthy nations are also plagued by substantial extreme poverty, with comparatively lower 
social and health amenities. Putting the account into greater perspective (Ndikumana & 
Boyce, 2012b): the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are among these 
countries with per capita incomes (wealth rank) of respectively $1,253 (15
th
), $4,176 (5
th
) and 
$8,649 (2
nd
) and oil reserve ranks of 8
th
 (Congo), 7
th
 (Gabon) and 10
th
 (Equatorial Guinea). 
Consistent with the account, a great portion of the population in these nations still live in very 
abject poverty. Accordingly, the lack of basic social services, drinkable water, elementary 
schools and decent sanitation are eloquent testimonies. For example, Gabon and Equatorial 
Guinea both rank second- and third-to-the last with 55% and 51% respectively of 
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immunization rates against measles. Moreover, the probability of a child reaching his/her fifth 
birthday in Equatorial Guinea is lower the average of the SSA sub-region.  
 Evidence of exclusive growth is provided by a recent global rankings on ‘quality of 
growth’ provided by the IMF (Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 27)2. Drawing from time-dynamic 
assessments of the performance from 93 developing nations in terms of ‘quality of growth’, 
rankings of the highlighted oil-wealthy nations have been deteriorating substantially. In 
essence, evidence from 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2011 shows increasing 
exclusive growth: Congo Republic (59
th
, 70
th
, 74
th
 & 84
th
), Gabon (58
th
, 61
st
, 67
th
 & 69
th
) and 
Equatorial Guinea (76
th
, 73
rd
, 76
th
 & 88
th
).  
 In light of the above, the position of SSA countries in Figure 1 is not surprising, given 
that the two decades of growth resurgence has been marred by inequality. The stance can be 
elucidated on two counts: (i) the relationships among, growth, inequality and poverty and (ii) 
evidence that growth in the sub-region has been marred by inequality which justifies the 
growing extreme poverty.  
 First, inequality substantially affects the relationship of growth on poverty because the 
inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than the growth elasticity of poverty (Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2014).  In more specific terms:  “The study finds that the responsiveness of 
poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010a, p. 818); “The 
responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality 
elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 
1432); and “In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in 
reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of 
growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). This evidence is consistent with studies focusing on Africa 
(Fosu, 2010ac) and a broad sample of developing nations (Fosu, 2010b; Asongu et al., 2014).  
 Second, Africa’s growth resurgence has been marred by inequality (Blas, 2014; 
Veselinovic, 2015). According to Veselinovic (2015), Africa’s growth has been characterised 
by the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. With seven of the 10 fastest-growing 
economies in the world, the highest expected-increase in the number of multimillionaires over 
the next 10 years (59%), it also has 6 to the 10 countries with the highest inequalities, notably: 
South Africa (65), Namibia (61.3), Botswana (60.5), Zambia (57.5), Central African Republic 
(56.3) and Lesotho (54.2).  
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that Mlachila et al. (2014) have presented a comparatively more holistic measurement of 
inclusive development, termed ‘quality of growth’.  
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 The facts on inequality substantially contrast with a recent strand of literature on 
Africa rising (Young, 2012; Leautier, 2012; Alan & Carlyn, 2015; Fosu, 2015). The continent 
is becoming the destination for luxury commodities (e.g Nigeria being a top Champagne 
market) and more than 50% of Africans still live in extreme poverty. It follows that, the fruits 
of economic prosperity gathered in recent decades have not rolled-down down to the poor. 
Moreover, the resource-industries driving African growth do not employ many people. Hence, 
the growth is not broad-based as only a few elite are benefiting from the economic prosperity.  
4. Resource-rich countries, transfer pricing (TP) and capital flight 
 We have seen above that TP contributes to more than 50% of illicit capital flight from 
developing countries. Consistent with Asongu (2014d), most of the illicit capital flight in 
Africa is driven by resource-rich nations (EURODAD, 2008, p.7). Hence, interactions among 
resource-wealth, TP and illicit capital flight are fundamental to the poverty tragedy or the 
spirit of poverty in SSA (Asongu, 2015a). But in order to fully understand these nexuses, it is 
important to engage how illicit capital flight is linked to poverty. 
 Drawing from Asiedu et al. (2012) and Asongu (2015a), one of the justifications put 
forward for Africa’s underdevelopment is the shortage of investment capital. In line with the 
Harrod-Domar model, three arguments have been advanced: (i) Africa is confronted with a 
‘financing gap’ issue because invested capital is substantially lower than the capital required 
for sustainable growth investment; (ii) long-run development is achievable with the bridging 
of the ‘financing gap’ and (iii) for the ‘financing gap’ to be filled, the continent would need 
external finance in the forms of development assistance and debts. It is in this light that calls 
for more development assistance have been increasing after unsuccessful attempts at 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) through domestic financial markets and 
liberalisation policies (Asiedu, 2004; Asongu, 2012). According to the authors, the relevance 
of external finance in Africa’s development has been encapsulated in the New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
 In line with Asiedu et al. (2012), the dependence on external finance by African 
countries to fight poverty is problematic for a threefold reason. First, development assistance 
and FDI are extremely volatile and such volatility has substantial adverse consequences on 
recipient economies, especially during global financial meltdowns (see Kangoye, 2013; 
Quartey & Afful-Mensah, 2014). Second, a bulk of recent literature has also shown that the 
impact of development assistance on economic growth is ambiguous. These includes, 
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provocative narratives like ‘foreign aid follies’ (Rogoff, 2014), sceptical surveys from more 
than four decades of development assistance (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008, 2009), radical 
positions (Asongu, 2014c) and clarifications on the questionable economics of development 
assistance in Africa (Asongu, 2015b), and inter alia, the need to reinvent foreign aid for 
inclusive and sustainable development in light of Piketty’s (2014) celebrated literature 
(Asongu, 2015c).   Third, efforts at attracting FDI to the SSA sub-region have not been very 
successful (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012). This narrative is consistent with the bulk 
of African business literature (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 
2013ab).  
 The current of literature above provides evidence to the fact that, the use of foreign aid 
to compensate for TP and/or illicit capital in SSA has several shortcomings. In essence, given 
that previous attempts at attracting other forms of external financial flows like FDI have not 
been successful and with the tendency unlikely to change in the near future, it would be 
unrealistic to suppose that overly reliance on development assistance would in the short- and 
medium-runs compensate for Africa’s investment needs. While solutions to the issue have 
varied from self-reliance (Fofack, 2014) to the recommendation ‘that sub-Saharan African 
nations establish effective strategies toward mitigating illicit capital flight within the 
framework of a broader agenda of resource mobilization for economic development’ 
(Asongu, 2015, p.19), the conjectures of Fosu presented in Section 3 clearly emphasise the 
need to improve inequality structures before the growth benefits in poverty eradication can be 
fully reaped. Hence, TP is as important to existing inequality structures in policy priority. 
Therefore, the two policy syndromes should be tackled simultaneously, with greater emphasis 
on structural inequality. We illustrate narratives in the last-three sections with the case study 
of Zambia.  
 
5. Case Study: Zambia, transfer pricing, Glencore, the Copper Industry and poverty 
TP represents a rational asymmetric development issue of how much profit is fair? In 
other words how much should be rationally stolen from Africa by MNEs operating in 
resource-rich countries? As far as we have reviewed, a case study that can objectively 
illustrate the line of inquiry addressed by this chapter is Zambia, Glencore and the Copper 
industry. Glencore Plc is an Anglo-Swiss MNE, specialized in mining and commodity 
trading, headquartered in Baar-Switzerland, ranked 10
th
 of the Fortune Global 500 of the 
world’s largest corporations and third largest family business of the world (Why Poverty, 
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2013). Zambia as a nation has been blessed with abundant natural resources, especially in 
copper. However, the paradox is that the country is ranked among the bottom 20 in terms of 
poverty. Hence, the country is rich and at the same time poor, which translates the issues 
inequality and asymmetric development (Why Poverty, 2013).  
The overarching issue is why Zambia with its abundant natural resources is one of the 
world’s poorest countries? In other words, why have booming copper prices not reduced her 
poverty? This has been widely debated in political and academic circles. In the former, some 
parliamentarians have even threatened to walk to the copper mines and request them pay their 
taxes. On the latter, there is an evolving stream of literature on TP in the Zambian copper 
industry (Ping, 2007; Azémar & Corcos, 2009; Adam & Simpasa, 2010; Why Poverty, 2013) 
.  While copper represents averagely more than 70% of exports, the ‘copper share of fiscal 
revenue’ and ‘copper revenue/GDP’ have revolved respectively between 0.1% and 12.9% and 
between 0.0% and 2.8% for the period 1994-2008 (Meller & Simpasa, 2011, p.20). Despite 
the fact that the price of copper nearly quadrupled between 2001 and 2008, the shares of 
copper in fiscal revenue and ‘revenue as a % of GDP’ remained averagely unchanged. For 
instance in 2006, while Copper exports from Zambia stood approximately at 3 billion USD, 
corresponding tax revenue was just 50 million USD. And given that the Zambian government 
has an underlying contract of furnishing electricity, which stood at 150 million USD for that 
year, it was a loss to the Zambian economy (Why Poverty, 2013). The fact that tax revenues 
paid by mining industries to Zambia did not increase correspondingly with the burgeoning of 
world copper prices eloquently translates the concept of TP.  In 2008, ‘if Zambia had received 
for its copper exports the same price that Switzerland declared for its copper exports, in the 
same quite detailed commodity categories, Zambia’s GDP would have nearly doubled that 
year’ (Why Poverty, 2013, 40:00mins  to 40:15mins).  
An audit of Mopani Copper Mines, initiated by the Zambian government has 
established evidence of TP. When the report was made public, the European Investment Bank 
suspended further loans to Glencore. The case has been reported to the OECD by one 
Zambian charity on charges that Glencore has been violating tax-related guidelines. 
Unfortunately, failure by Glencore to cooperate has led the OECD to admit it can do nothing 
about the case if one party refuses to cooperate (Why Poverty, 2013). 
Glencore is the world’s largest integrated commodity trader, with a yearly turnover of 
approximately 180 billion USD which is more than 8 times the GDP of Zambia. It controls 
Mopani Copper Mines in Zambia, with a 73% stake and all copper produced by Mopani is 
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sold to Glencore. The copper from Zambia is sold among subsidiaries of Glencore such that 
the highest margins are obtained from those located in countries with low or no tax 
requirements (Why Poverty, 2013).  
Environmental issues have also been raised, with some of Glencore’s activities 
suspended because of diluted acids drifting from production plants to homes. There have been 
incidences in 2005 and 2008 in which contaminated water has sent hundreds of people in 
townships near the Mopani Copper Mines to hospitals. Sulfur dioxide emitted by the mines is 
causing severe respiratory problems. Some accounts even sustain that the emissions of 
impurities by the mines is about 1000 times higher than the limits tolerated by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) (Why Poverty, 2013). We resist the itch of engaging this 
dimension further because it may derail us from the TP focus of the study. 
 Today, with the copper boom, unemployment is not decreasing and about 64% of 
Zambians still live below the poverty line (Why Poverty, 2013). Moreover, it is the fourth 
country with the highest inequality rate in the world (Veselinovic, 2015). A logical 
implication here is that even in the absence of TP, the elite of the country would still exercises 
rational asymmetric development practices by preventing the juice of economic prosperity 
from trickling down to the poor. Hence, it is fundamental to deal with the inequalities 
structures in the country, so that, if and when fair taxes are paid by MNEs, their externalities 
are broad-based and not captured by a few.  
 
6. Concluding implications  
 
A recent publication by the World Bank on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
has established that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of over two decades of growth resurgence. 
This chapter has explored the role of transfer pricing in SSA’s extreme poverty tragedy. The 
analytical structure entails: (i) emphasis of rational asymmetric development as the dark side 
of transfer pricing, (ii) evidence that the recent growth resurgence in African countries has 
been driven substantially by resource-rich countries which are experiencing high levels of 
exclusive growth and extreme poverty, (iii) the practice of  transfer pricing by multinationals 
operating  in resource-rich countries of  SSA and (iv) a Zambian case study of extreme 
poverty and  transfer pricing schemes by Glencore in the copper industry.  
Two main policy implications are derived for the fight against extreme poverty. First, 
Africa needs to deal with its inequality structures, because the current tendency shows that 
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even in the absence of transfer pricing, inequality is still worsening. Second, the concept of 
rational asymmetric development is not only limited to the relationship between developed 
nations and African countries by the bond of transfer pricing or illicit capital flows. Such tax 
avoidance mechanisms also substantially exist between the rich and poor segments of African 
populations. Hence, the rich of poor countries also device all kinds of schemes to avoid 
declaring their full incomes and hence, limiting the tax paid for the ultimate delivery of 
collective or public commodities.  
In essence, if the component of  growth that survives transfer pricing practices cannot 
trickle down to the poor, there is no guarantee that even with the absence of detrimental 
transfer pricing, the incremental growth would have trickled-down to the poor. Dealing with 
the structures promoting inequality would entail, inter alia, understanding the role of 
inequality in poverty-growth transformations. Accordingly, inequality substantially affects the 
relationship of growth on poverty because the inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than 
the growth elasticity of poverty (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2014).  In more specific terms:  
“The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of 
inequality” (Fosu, 2010a, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing 
function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the 
income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 1432); and “In general, high initial levels of 
inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality 
increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). This evidence is 
consistent with studies focusing on Africa (Fosu, 2010ac) and a broad sample of developing 
nations (Fosu, 2010b; Asongu et al., 2014).  
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